Edward Rainey v. Diamond State Port by unknown
2009 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-7-2009 
Edward Rainey v. Diamond State Port 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 
Recommended Citation 
"Edward Rainey v. Diamond State Port" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 134. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/134 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1                                           NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                                             ___________
No. 09-2003
___________
EDWARD RAINEY,
                                                   Appellant
v.
DIAMOND STATE PORT CORP.
                                   _ _____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D. Del. Civ. No. 08-cv-00102)
District Judge:  Honorable Sue L. Robinson         
_______________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 3, 2009
Before:  SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
                                             (Opinion Filed: December 7, 2009)                                    
_________
 OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM.
Pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Appellant Edward
Rainey filed a pro se employment discrimination action in the District Court against his
former employer, Diamond State Port Corporation (“Diamond State”), alleging that he
2was unlawfully disciplined and terminated on account of his race.   Despite being served
with the complaint, Diamond State failed to answer or otherwise respond to it.  On March
27, 2009, the District Court entered a default judgment in Rainey’s favor, but it awarded
him only nominal damages in the amount of $250 because it doubted the merit of his
claim.  Rainey appealed.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s
order.
I.  Background
In May 2007, Rainey was terminated from his job at Diamond State after
the company determined that he was the aggressor in a physical altercation with a co-
worker.  The incident was apparently Rainey’s second confrontation with a co-worker
within a year.  The evidence provided by Rainey to the District Court indicated that he
was the likely aggressor in each confrontation.  Rainey requested a grievance hearing, and
was represented by his Union at the hearing, but the grievance officer upheld the
termination.  
Rainey filed a complaint with the Delaware Department of Labor.  At the
completion of its investigation on July 13, 2007, the Delaware Department of Labor
issued a “No-Cause Determination” and issued Rainey a Right to Sue Notice.  He filed
his complaint with the District Court for the District of Delaware on February 15, 2008,
and service was effectuated by the United States Marshals Service.  The defendant filed
no response to Rainey’s complaint and made no appearance.  After the Clerk entered a
3default, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), which was mailed to defendant, Rainey filed a motion
for default judgment.  Default judgment was granted; however, the District Court
reviewed Rainey’s submissions, concluded that it had doubts regarding the merits of his
claims, and awarded him only $250 in nominal damages.  Rainey appealed.   
II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We
review the District Court’s handling of a default judgment, including its computation of
damages and decision whether to conduct a hearing on damages for abuse of discretion
only.  See, e.g., Hritz v. Woma Corp., 732 F.2d 1178, 1180 (3d Cir. 1984); KPS &
Assocs., Inc. v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2003).  A District Court
abuses its discretion when its decision “rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.” Morris v. Horn, 187
F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Reform party v. Allegheny County Dept. of
Elections, 174 F.3d 305, 311 (3d Cir. 1999) (en banc)).      
III.  Analysis
When a plaintiff prevails by default, he or she is not automatically entitled
to the damages they originally demanded.  Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142,
1149 (3d Cir. 1990).  Rather, defaults are treated as admissions of the facts alleged, but a
plaintiff may still be required to prove that he or she is entitled to the damages sought. 
Id.;  DIRECTV Inc. v. Pepe, 431 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2005).  The damages Rainey
  Typically, once a plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to1
the defendant to establish a nondiscriminatory reason for taking the adverse employment
action.  If the defendant can do so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the
defendant’s justifications were mere pretext.  This burden shifting cannot occur when a
plaintiff prevails by default because the defendant declines to participate in the litigation,
as is the case here.  Appropriately, given the circumstances, the District Court looked to
whether Rainey made out a prima facie case.
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sought could not be determined with exactness on the cause of action by a simple
mathematical calculation or by application of definitive rules of law.  “If it is necessary to
determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any averment by evidence,
the court may conduct a hearing.”  Durant v. Husband, 28 F.3d 12, 15 (3d Cir. 1994)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2)) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For
the reasons that follow, we do not believe Rainey has shown an abuse of discretion in the
District Court’s decision to award only nominal damages in the absence of a hearing.
To win damages in an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must
prove membership in a protected class and that he or she was terminated on account of
membership in that protected class rather than for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).   To do so, a plaintiff can1
produce direct evidence of his or her employers’ illegal motives or show that similarly
situated employees who were not members of the protected class were treated more
favorably.  Id.    
To determine if Rainey has met his burden we review the evidence that was
before the District Court.  Rainey’s evidence showed that he was involved in two fights at
5work during the year prior to his termination, and that he was deemed the aggressor in
each incident.  Although he disputes that he was in fact the aggressor, he did not offer any
evidence of similarly situated white or female employees who had kept their jobs, despite
being deemed the aggressors in multiple physical altercations on the job.  Nor did he offer
any evidence that defendant deemed him the aggressor because he was a member of a
protected class or that he was fired for a discriminatory purpose.  
After the District Court’s clerk entered the default, the District Court
provided Rainey an opportunity to demonstrate his entitlement to damages by ordering
Rainey to file a statement outlining the damages he was seeking and to provide support
for those damages.  In response to that order Rainey filed an incoherent statement and
attached a variety of financial statements and personal bills, which the court sealed to
protect his privacy.  The closest Rainey came to properly alleging discrimination is his
statement in his informal brief before us, in which he stated “Timmy Miller full timer
employee get wrote up 3 or 4 times and was on contract still have his job, Kelly Thomas
and Brgette two part timer union sisters fithing same matter like assaults on union people
[sic.].” Without further information regarding the demographics of the employees named
above and their circumstances, it is impossible for us to determine if Rainey was treated
less favorably on account of a protected ground.  Regardless, Rainey did not present this
information to the District Court when he was given the opportunity to do so.  Under
these circumstances, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding only nominal damages because it was clear that even when all of the factual
allegations and evidence were considered in the light most favorable to Rainey, he did not
make allegations sufficient to establish that he was fired on account of his membership in
a protected class.  It is therefore clear that Rainey could not establish any entitlement to
damages beyond the $250 in nominal damages he was awarded by the District Court on
account of the defendant’s default, even if the court had held a hearing.   
IV.  Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment
awarding Rainey $250 in nominal damages.   
        6  
